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I.

INTRODUCTION

According to an op-ed published in Time magazine, genealogy is
“the second most popular hobby in the U.S. after gardening,” with
the popularity of online genealogy sites second only to those devoted
to pornography.1 This popularity has led to huge databases of genetic
information in the hands of commercial services such as 23 and Me,
Ancestry.com, and GEDmatch, with the first two companies alone
holding more than 10 million DNA samples.2 While GEDmatch holds
only a million samples, it is an open source (free) database that offers far less privacy protection than do the major commercial
databases.3
The data held in these records is overwhelming and access to
much of that data is, so far, “wholly unregulated.”4 It is a vast trove
of searchable information for law enforcement that, thus far, may be
accessed without the requirement of a warrant. Law enforcement
has been energetically pursuing the opportunities these data
present.5 In the spring of 2018, one such database was used to
identify Joseph DeAngelo as the Golden State Killer, a serial killer
1

Antony Kolene, “23 and Plea”: Limiting Police Use of Genealogy Sites After
Carpenter v. United States, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 65 (2019) (quoting Gregory
Rodriguez, How Genealogy Became Almost as Popular as Porn, TIME (May 30,
2014), https://time.com/133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popular-as-por
n/).
2

Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 65.

3

George M. Dery, III, Can a Distant Relative Allow the Government Access to
Your DNA?, 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 112–13 (2019).
4

Sarah Zhang, How a Genealogy Website Led to the Alleged Golden State
Killer, THE ATLANTIC (April 27, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2018/04/golden-state-killer-east-area-rapist-dna-genealogy/559070/ (quoting N.Y.U.
School of Law Professor Erin Murphy). Although close familial searches through
forensic databases are “highly regulated,” searching for distant relatives through
open source data is not. See Yaniv Erlich, Tal Shor, Itsik Pe’er, & Shai Carmi,
Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial Searches 362 SCI.
690 (2018).
5

See, e.g., Amelia Putnam, A Genetic Panopticon of Our Own Making: How
the Fourth Amendment Applies to Commercial Genealogy DNA Testing, 56 CRIM. L.
BULL. 221 (2020).
© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 3

563

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN
“believed responsible for 12 killings, 50 rapes, and 100 burglaries
from 1974 and 1986.”6 Police made the identification after comparing DNA found at crime scenes to the open source DNA records
available on GEDmatch and identifying his distant relatives as relatives of the killer. They found DeAngelo after whittling their options
down from a family of over a thousand members to just five possible
men.7 Finally, police obtained DNA from DeAngelo’s car door, tested
it against the samples they had obtained from crime scenes, and
found that his DNA matched.8
Since DeAngelo’s arrest, law enforcement has used the same
techniques to make arrests in over a dozen cases—including the
1992 murder of Christy Mirack and the 1988 rape and murder of
eight year old April Tinsley.9 And in January of this year, police in
Chicago announced that they believed they solved a string of
murders committed between 1976 and 1981 using genealogical
information.10 In fact, one study found that police used the tactics to
make arrests in thirteen cases in just five months, not all of them
“cold cases” (that might be considered extreme and justifying
extraordinary measures).11 That same study claimed that 60% of
Americans of European descent could be identified by their relatives’
use of genealogical databases, and 90% of Americans of European
descent would be identifiable within only a few years.12
The strength of DNA evidence and the steadily increasing reach
of genealogical identification bring fears of an all-seeing, all-knowing,
all-powerful government.13 Can it be possible for the government to
6

Dery, supra note 3, at 105.

7

Dery, supra note 3, at 113–14.

8

Dery, supra note 3, at 114.

9

Dery, supra note 3, at 115–16.

10

David Struett, Suspected Serial Killer Identified in 1976 Murder of 16-YearOld Girl in Lisle, Prosecutors Say, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://chicago.su
ntimes.com/crime/2020/1/13/21063778/pamela-maurer-bruce-lindahl-lisle-cold-cas
e-murder-strangled-college-road. For more information about the burgeoning field
dubbed “forensic genealogy,” see Christi J. Guerrini, Jill O. Robinson, Devan
Petersen, & Amy L. McGuire, Should Police Have Access to Genetic Genealogy
Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a
Controversial New Forensic Technique, PLOS: BIOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://journal
s.plos.org/plosbiology/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906&type=printable.
11

Erlich et al., supra note 4, at 690.

12

Erlich et al., supra note 4, at 690.

13

See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 4.
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obtain such reach and knowledge without even a warrant? Should
the Fourth Amendment allow it?14
These questions are hardly new. As technology has improved,
more and more technological advancements have triggered privacy
fears.15 Doctrinally, these concerns have been most persistent and
developed regarding the ability to track location data provided by
portable communication devices (like beepers and cell phones) and
GPS devices.16 In cases raising such concerns, U.S. Supreme
Justices began to recognize how developing technology was
enabling new levels of privacy violations, by offering insight into
intimate aspects of life. For instance, in a single case, Justice
Sotomayor expressed her concern that location data provided by a
GPS tracking device might reveal details such as “trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-thehour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church,
14

As Amelia Putnam explained in a previous issue of the Criminal Law Bulletin,
the U.S. Department of Justice “announced new guidelines regarding law
enforcement’s use of genetic genealogy sites for investigative purposes” during the
fall of 2019. Putnam, supra note 5, at 229 (citing Dep’t of Justice, Interim Policy
Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching (2019), https://www.jus
tice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download).
The guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 2019, state that genealogy sites can
only serve as “an investigative lead” for violent crimes after officers have exhausted all
other investigative methods, and a “suspect shall not be arrested based solely on a
genetic association generated” by the genealogy results. [But, the] guidelines do not
require law enforcement to obtain a search warrant backed by probable cause to conduct
the genealogical investigation.

Putnam, supra note 5, at 229.
15

See, e.g., U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 383–84, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 75 L. Ed.
2d 55 (1983) (expressing concern as to whether surveilling an individual by tracking
a hidden beeper twenty-four hours a day might create too significant an invasion of
privacy for the third party doctrine to negate the violation); U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 716–17, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984) (holding that although installation of tracking beeper pursuant to an informant’s consent did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, monitoring it in a private residence violates the homeowner’s
reasonable expectation of privacy); Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34–35, 121 S. Ct.
2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (expressing concern that homeowners’ privacy would
be left “at the mercy of advancing technology”); U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415,
426, 428, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) (Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s
opinions expressing concern as to the extent of privacy invasion achieved through
GPS tracking); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385–86, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L.
Ed. 2d 430, 42 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1925 (2014) (requiring police to obtain a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone); Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206,
2220–21, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018) (finding the use of cell site tracking to surveille
defendants to invade on privacy and therefore require a warrant).
16

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 34–35; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–28; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
at 2220–21.

© 2020 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 56 No. 3

565

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN
the gay bar and on and on.”17 In that same case, Justice Alito pointed
to the ease with which such invasions could be conducted by police
departments that at one time “would have required a large team of
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Only an
investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an
expenditure of law enforcement resources.”18
Most recently, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that
using cell phone companies’ business records to obtain historical
location data (cell-site location information) was a search that
required a warrant.19 The Court’s ruling was based on an understanding that the Fourth Amendment was intended “to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’ [and] ‘to place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.’ ’’20 And while Carpenter
was, and is, clearly limited to cell phones and cell site location data,
any casual observer can see that the threat to which the Court was
responding relates to far more varied technology than what has
been discussed within the limits of the Court’s cases so far. Academics have tried to predict the effects of Carpenter, from the use of
automated license plate readers21 and the geolocation and activity
data collected by workout apps,22 to the vast amount of routine data
collected through internet connectivity23 and biometric data, such as
facial recognition.24
The current “From the Legal Literature” column summarized two
17

Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16.

18

Jones, 565 U.S. at 429.

19

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.

20

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.

21

E.g., Lauren Fash, Automated License Plate Readers: The Difficult Balance
of Solving Crime and Protecting Individual Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 75–78
(2019).
22

E.g., Anne Toomey McKenna, Amy C. Gaudion, & Jenni L. Evans, The Role
of Satellites and Smart Devices: Data Surprises and Security, Privacy, and Regulatory Challenges, 123 PENN. ST. L. REV. 591 (2019) (discussing the threat to privacy
posed by aggregation of such data by smart devices).
23

E.g., Graham Johnson, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Why Changing
Expectations Demand Heightened Standards, 11 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 345,
(2019) (describing the privacy risks associated with the internet connectivity and
arguing for a new framework that would more thoroughly protect privacy); Steven I.
Friedland, Drinking From the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance From the
Internet of Things Is Changing the Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891 (2019)
(suggesting that the “Fourth Amendment ought to be interpreted to recognize the
prevalence and importance of limited purpose disclosures much like the idea of
privileges used to promote certain relationships”).
24

E.g., Matthew Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public Perceptions
of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 107 (2019); Elizabeth Snyder,
Note, “Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial Recognition Technology to Conduct Unlawful Searches, 68 SYR. L. REV. 255 (2019).
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articles that have applied the Court’s most recent decisions to law
enforcement’s use of DNA data and genealogy.25 While these two
academics largely agree in their reading of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, they come to varying conclusions on the particular strategies used to identify the killers discussed above. Their arguments
are discussed below.
II. Antony Kolene, “23 and Plea”: Limiting Police Use of
Genealogy Sites After Carpenter v. United States, 122 W. VA. L.
REV. 53 (2019).
Antony Kolene’s “23 and Plea” offers two main points to the
discussion of DNA data and criminal procedure. First, writing shortly
after the decision in Carpenter, Kolene offers an exploration of the
privacy interests articulated, and how those interests may affect
judicial rulings on the use of DNA data.26 Second, he suggests that
the re-emergence of a property-based theory of privacy may provide
greater protection against DNA searches than does the amorphous
“reasonable expectation of privacy” understanding.27
Kolene begins his discussion with an overview of Fourth Amendment surveillance doctrine.28 He opens with the common law prohibition on trespass and moves through the development of the Katz
“reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis.29 Kolene describes
these two understandings, one based in property interests and the
other in social expectations, as separate but concurrent tracks of
Fourth Amendment analysis. 30 He notes the Court’s efforts to
respond to the threat posed by advancing technology in Kyllo v.
United States31 and the Court’s apparent sensitivity to the amount of
information about a person that could be mined through that technology (in the form of cell phone storage) in United States v. Jones32
25

See also Putnam, supra note 5, passim.

26

Kolene, supra note 1, at 72–100.

27

Kolene, supra note 1, at 79–83.

28

Kolene, supra note 1, at 57–62.

29

Kolene, supra note 1, at 57–58.

30

Kolene, supra note 1, at 57.

31

Kolene, supra note 1, at 59; see also Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34, 35, 121
S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (holding the use of thermal imaging devices
and seminar sense-enhancing technology to gather information within a private
home that could not otherwise be obtained without a physical intrusion violates the
Fourth Amendment).
32

Kolene, supra note 1, at 59; U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–11, 132 S. Ct.
945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) (holding that trespassing onto private property to attach a GPS tracking device to a vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment).
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and Riley v. California.33 He also describes, very briefly, the third
party doctrine, which states that “a Fourth Amendment search under
Katz does not occur when a suspect entrusts private information to
a third party, who then betrays the suspect to the police.”34
Kolene then gives a very basic overview of the Carpenter decision.
He notes that, in Carpenter, the Court found a situation where the
expectation of privacy in physical movements (established in Jones
and Knotts), comes in direct conflict with the third party doctrine.35
Not only did the Court expressly determine that there existed an
expectation of privacy against the “near perfect surveillance” of cell
phone location data, it refused to limit that expectation based on the
third party doctrine.36 Noting that Justice Gorsuch specifically alluded
to DNA in his dissent, Kolene suggests that this case should have
repercussions for the use of genealogical research by law enforcement as well.37
To highlight this point, Kolene dives into an explanation of DNA,
its utility for identification, and the various sources of DNA
databases.38 These databases include not only the commercial
services like 23 and Me or Ancestry.com, but also government run
databases made up of DNA samples taken from suspects upon arrest, or picked up at crimes scenes.39 This is a reminder of the millions of searchable samples that currently exist, and therefore the
potential extent and capabilities of genealogical surveillance.
Kolene then proceeds to analyze whether the use of this data
33

Kolene, supra note 1, at 59–60; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
385–86, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, 42 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1925 (2014)
(requiring police to obtain a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone).
34

Kolene, supra note 1, at 59; see also U.S. v. Miller, 1976-1 C.B. 535, 425
U.S. 435, 442–45, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P
9380, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1261 (1976) (holding that bank customers have no
protectible Fourth Amendment interest in their bank records since they are disclosed
to third parties, namely bank employees); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44,
99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979) (holding there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in telephone numbers dialed as captured and reported by a pen register
because phone users voluntarily convey numerical information to telephone
companies in the ordinary course of business). For empirical critiques of these holdings, however, see Christine S. A. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella, & Ryan G.
Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the
Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2016); Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow,*
Ryan G. Fischer, & Connie E. Ireland, Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 289 (2011).
35

Kolene, supra note 1, at 60–61.

36

Kolene, supra note 1, at 61.

37

Kolene, supra note 1, at 62.

38

Kolene, supra note 1, at 62–66.

39

Kolene, supra note 1, at 64–66.
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constitutes an invasion of privacy, under Katz and Carpenter. Kolene
dismisses any privacy interest in the samples populating government run databases—these, he says, have either been expressly allowed by the Court as a means of identifying suspects, or have been
“abandoned,” and therefore not private (a concept subject to some
controversy, but, Kolene says, largely ignored in the courts).40
This leaves commercial or open sources databases.41 To analyze
the privacy implications here, Kolene outlines the reasoning of the
Carpenter Court. He argues that the Court relied on five main factors to determine whether information is private: intimacy (private
details such as familial, religious, or sexual associations); comprehensiveness (the detail or extent of information); expense and difficulty (the inexpense of the investigation weighs in favor of privacy
rights); retrospectivity (we do not expect the government to be able
to learn information about a criminal suspect even before the suspect
is under investigation); and voluntariness (whether a person as affirmatively offered information into someone else’s view).42 Each of
these, Kolene suggests, weighs in favor of a privacy interest in DNA
samples held in DNA databases (even voluntariness, as most
genealogy sites promise privacy and control of one’s data).43 This is
due to the detail included in DNA samples. Whereas government
databases are presumably used only for identification of suspects,
commercial databases offer comprehensive and intimate biological
details about “the whole of a person’s genetic makeup.”44
However, a suspect has no standing to argue that his or her
privacy interest has been violated when it is not the suspect’s DNA,
but a relative’s DNA that is found.45 This, Kolene argues, is similar to
a suspect who tries to suppress evidence found in an illegal search
of a relative’s house. Kolene reminds the reader that “personal rights
‘may not be vicariously asserted,’ ’’ and “a search of a third party’s
premises or property” cannot be challenged because the suspect
has no standing.46
Kolene also addresses the question of DNA analysis via the
property based track of surveillance doctrine, as opposed to the
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Here, he finds the
same results—he suggests that the Court would likely recognize a
property interest in a person’s own cells given the facts that some
40

Kolene, supra note 1, at 68–70.

41

Kolene, supra note 1, at 71.

42

Kolene, supra note 1, at 72–74.

43

Kolene, supra note 1, at 74–75.

44

Kolene, supra note 1, at 71.

45

Kolene, supra note 1, at 75–77.

46

Kolene, supra note 1, at 76.
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legislatures have already recognized such an interest, genealogy
companies largely state that DNA remains the property of the person
who has submitted it, and courts have recognized such ownership in
the past.47 Courts likely would not recognize a property interest in
relatives’ DNA, however, as “[n]o accepted principle of property law
would support the notion that one person ‘owns’ another person’s
DNA as a matter of natural right.”48
But, up until this point, Kolene has delayed addressing the third
party doctrine. In part IV, Kolene reaches this discussion. He gives a
brief overview of its history49 before turning to Carpenter’s impact.50
While the Court in Carpenter did not overturn the doctrine, it
exempted cell site location data based on the extent of privacy
concerns implicated and the argument that the data is not knowingly
shared with others (as, the Court appears to argue, it was knowingly
shared in Smith and Miller).51 While the extent of privacy invasion is
clearly extreme,52 Kolene suggests that the level of voluntariness
with which information is provided to genealogy websites negates
even this privacy protection (at least under a Katz expectation of
privacy analysis).53 This is because all genealogy websites (even, as
of recently, GEDmatch) require registration, post privacy policies
online, and allow users to modify the amount of control they maintain
over their data.54 The number of express permissions users are
required to give makes it difficult to argue, as was the case with cell
site location data, that the relevant information was turned over
unknowingly.
In contrast, Kolene argues, a property based understanding would
offer greater protection even in under the third party doctrinal
analysis.55 This is because “a protected property interest [is] at stake”
and “the owner of the property has merely created a bailment . . .
to hold the DNA data in trust . . . A trespass on that data is still a
trespass on a current property interest owned by the user.”56 This
means that, while the third party doctrine would still overwhelm the
Katz-based privacy interests articulated above, a property based
47

Kolene, supra note 1, at 80–81.

48

Kolene, supra note 1, at 83.

49

Kolene, supra note 1, at 85–87.

50

Kolene, supra note 1, at 87.

51

Kolene, supra note 1, at 87–88.

52

Kolene, supra note 1, at 97

53

Kolene, supra note 1, at 98.

54

Kolene, supra note 1, at 90–95, 98 (discussing privacy policies).

55

Kolene, supra note 1, at 99–100.

56

Kolene, supra note 1, at 100.
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understanding of the Fourth Amendment might provide protection
against searches of suspects’ DNA (if not that of their relatives).
Even under this analysis, Kolene finds no protection against law
enforcement searches of relatives’ DNA. He finds this to be a
problem, as these searches might enable discrimination, biological
determinism, and frightening levels of simple error.57 As he finds no
real protection in Constitutional doctrine, even in light of Carpenter’s
expansion of Fourth Amendment protections, he suggests that
legislative oversight is necessary.58
III. GEORGE M. DERY, III, CAN A DISTANT RELATIVE ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO YOUR DNA? 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103 (2019).
Like Kolene, George M. Dery III, explores the application of
Carpenter to police searches of genealogy databases. Dery begins
with more detailed exploration of recent cases,59 and less detailed
exploration of established Fourth Amendment doctrine and history.60
Like Kolene, Dery suggests that the Court’s prior ruling on DNA
analysis in Maryland v. King61 is not controlling, as it is limited to
“junk” DNA that can be used only to identify a suspect, and cannot
offer the biological details that are available in full DNA samples.62
Additionally, Dery points out the King Court’s reliance on the idea
that suspects who are in police custody have diminished expectations of privacy63 and the historical right of police to conduct a search
as part of any arrest.64
Unlike Kolene, Dery frames the Carpenter decision wholly in reference to the third party doctrine. Before moving to his discussion of
Carpenter, he offers a more expansive discussion of the principles
and reasoning underlying the third party doctrine,65 and he introduces
Carpenter not as a development in the legal analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy, but as “[t]he Court’s latest pronouncement on the third party doctrine.”66 But the factors Dery pulls from
the opinion echo those Kolene identified. Dery focuses on the
57

Kolene, supra note 1, at 102–03.

58

Kolene, supra note 1, at 104–106.

59

Dery, supra note 3, at 105–08, 111–16.

60

Dery, supra note 3, at 108–11.

61

Dery, supra note 3, at 116–21 (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449–64,
133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013) (holding that a search using a buccal swab
to obtain defendant’s DNA sample after an arrest for a serious offense is reasonable under Fourth Amendment).
62

Dery, supra note 3, at 119.

63

Dery, supra note 3, at 119.

64

Dery, supra note 3, at 120.

65

Dery, supra note 3, at 121–24.

66

Dery, supra note 3, at 123.
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Carpenter Court’s limiting of the third party doctrine, 67 and its
emphasis on the comprehensiveness, intimacy, and retrospective
nature of information provided by cell cite location data.68 He also
notes the weight the Court gave to the reach and capabilities of
police technology,69 and the “necess[ity] today that people ‘compulsively carry cellphones with them all the time,’ ’’ (directing attention
to whether this data can be said to be voluntarily exposed to the
public).70 After noting how perfectly the language of the Court in
Carpenter might describe genealogical research (“If a cellphone is
‘almost a feature of human anatomy,’ DNA is quite literally a feature
of human anatomy”),71 Dery addresses the third-party consent hurdle
to Fourth Amendment protection.
Dery offers a deeper exploration into third party consent to
searches than does Kolene and comes to largely differing
conclusions. Rather than understanding the principle as a purely
property based doctrine, Dery brings out the doctrinal emphasis on
“widely shared social expectations” and understandings of privacy,
as well as the suspect’s assumption of the risk of search.72In contrast
to searches of shared rooms, suspects cannot be said to have assumed the risk of sharing their DNA with relatives who upload the
data to genealogy websites. One cannot choose not to share DNA
with relatives, and one cannot control what relatives do with their
own DNA data.73 And, although genealogy sites are too new to have
developed “widely shared social expectations” regarding their use,
Dery argues that eventually such expectations “will likely forbid one
person giving the government permission to use shared DNA against
a relative.”74
Having determined that the third party consent doctrine likely
would not allow for genealogical searches of relatives’ DNA, Dery
moves on to the question of whether such searches might be viewed
as government use of a private intrusion (government use of a
search conducted by a suspect’s relative).75 Dery notes the Court’s
prior determinations that the government may use evidence that is
the result of a third party’s invasion of the suspect’s privacy—for
instance when a private party opens a suspect’s packages
67

Dery, supra note 3, at 125.

68

Dery, supra note 3, at 125–26.

69

Dery, supra note 3, at 127.

70

Dery, supra note 3, at 127.

71

Dery, supra note 3, at 126–28.

72

Dery, supra note 3, at 130–31.

73

Dery, supra note 3, at 132–33.

74

Dery, supra note 3, at 133–34.

75

Dery, supra note 3, at 135.
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accidentally. 76 This line of cases would seem to suggest that
genealogical searches might not require a warrant, as the relative
uploading the data has essentially performed the search already,
and the government is simply capitalizing on that intrusion.77 Dery
acknowledges that Fourth Amendment protection may be granted, if
the government search goes beyond the private party’s invasion, but
suggests that the type of genealogical research performed in the
Golden State Killer case does not seem to rise to that level of added
search.78
Finally, Dery approaches the standing issue.79 Here he agrees that
precedent seems to undermine any opportunity to extend Fourth
Amendment protection against genealogical searches.80 This is
because, under Byrd v. United States, standing to assert Fourth
Amendment protection extends only to people who “can exclude
others” from the relevant area.81 Under this line of cases, the right to
exclude is a necessary aspect of control of property, and therefore
of the right to assert standing in regards to a Fourth Amendment
violation.82 After all, an individual who never could have excluded
others from an area cannot have expected the area to remain
private.83 Since a person cannot exclude relatives from searching
their own DNA data, standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation against police searches through relatives’ data is impossible
under this property based understanding.84
Given the multiple contradicting lines of precedent that might influence the question of police searches of genealogy sites, Dery’s
conclusion is limited. Dery maintains that the ruling in Carpenter
strongly suggests a privacy interest in DNA, even DNA data held by
genealogy sites and provided by relatives.85 This is because of the
76

Dery, supra note 3, at 135–36.

77

Dery, supra note 3, at 138.
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Dery, supra note 3, at 141–42 (citing Byrd v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530–31,
200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018) (reasoning that the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed as an authorized driver on rental
agreement does not defeat that person’s otherwise reasonable expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
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depth and breadth of information provided in these DNA samples.86
But he acknowledges that the third party consent doctrines allow
openings for warrantless searches of this information, and suggests
that a future Court will likely have the opportunity to simply choose
which of these lines of cases it wants to follow.87
It remains unclear what course the U.S. Supreme Court will take
when presented with this question. What is clear, however, is that
the question is coming, and its resolution will have a strong impact
on police departments’ newly developing methods of investigation.
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Dery, supra note 3, at 145.
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Dery, supra note 3, at 145; see also Putnam, supra note 5, at 258–269 (suggesting potential solutions to the privacy conundrum raised by law enforcement
searches of familial DNA databases).
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